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Dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) differentiate between moral and immoral actors
Katherine E. Ford and Ellen E. Furlong
Department of Psychology, Illinois Wesleyan University
Method

Introduction
• The origin of morality has been a topic of debate since
at least the 15th century. The Hobbesian (1651) view
argues that morality derives from culture, while the
Rousseauvian (1763) view argues that morality is
innate.
• This debate continues, but recent work supports the
Rousseauvian innateness view, including:
• The universality of moral traits such as the tendency
to do no harm (Foot, 1967)
• Evidence of moral behavior in preverbal infants
(Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007, Hamlin, 2013)
• Evidence of moral behavior in animals such as rats,
monkeys and elephants including prosocial behavior,
avoiding causing harm to another, and accepting a
small reward in return for giving another a large
reward (Wechlin et al., 1964, Bartal, Decety & Mason,
2011, Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008)
• However, while we know animals exhibit ‘moral’
behaviors, do they have the same moral intuitions
shared by humans?

• Subjects
• Domestic dogs of all ages, multiple breeds,
male and female
• Recruited on a volunteer basis with owner’s
permission
• Subjects were tested at an on-site laboratory at
IWU and at a nearby pet daycare in
Bloomington, IL

Results
•
•

If dogs prefer the moral actor to the immoral actor, they
should look longer at the former.
Though we do not yet have enough statistical power to
detect differences (Immoral: n = 6; Moral: n = 11) preliminary
analyses support this pattern
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The Present Study
• Domestic dogs have not been extensively tested for moral
behavior, but seem capable of exhibiting these behaviors
• Dogs have superior social skills when interacting with their own or
other species
• Domestic dogs can pick up social cues and perceive the goals of
human actions (Marshall-Pescini, Ceretta & Prato-Previde, 2014;
Stauch, et al, 2015)
• Therefore, we hypothesize that dogs will use moral-based
influence when watching a neutral actor interact with a moral and
immoral actor.
• To test this we replicated Hamlin & Wynn’s (2011) with preverbal
infants.

Discussion & Implications
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• Preliminary data suggests that domestic dogs may discern between a moral
and immoral actor
• These results provide support for the innate morality theory, and specifically
the existence of moral intuition or behavior in non-human animals
• Further research is necessary to determine if domestic dogs are truly
capable of morals, or solely moral behavior
• As continuing evidence for animal moral behavior is discovered, researchers
must question whether morality is uniquely human and whether animals are
more psychologically advanced than previously thought
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